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Abstract: The confrontation with Western colonialism has 
become part of the Islamic history since the nineteenth 
century.  This paper is an attempt to investigate the 
radicalization of religion in several parts of the Islamic 
world.  It focuses, however, on the review of the history of 
the caliphate and its adjunct notions like “pan-Islamism” or 
rule over all Muslims, and jihād to fight for it. Having 
assessed the attempts made by Muslim in several parts of 
the Islamic world in dealing with Western colonialism, the 
paper then reflects the manifestation of Islamic politics in 
Indonesia. The paper argues that the majority of Muslims 
whenever they have a chance to voice their aspirations, do 
not support a radicalization or even militarization of their 
religion. Muslims in Indonesia, in particular, had this 
chance to opt for their political or societal aspirations in 
several general elections, and the large majority of them 
voted for politicians and parties who pursue an inclusive 
policy, reflecting the plural composition of their society. 
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Introduction 
The movement of Islamic Modernization or Revivalism emerged 
since the beginning of the 19th century as a response to the social and 
political experiences made by a great number of the Islamic 
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communities all over the world.1 The main factor was the 
confrontation with Western colonialism and, particularly after the 
Congress of Vienna 1815, the imperialism of the great European 
powers, particularly Great Britain, Russia, and France. Their 
counterparts on the Muslim side were at that time still existing Empire 
of the Moghuls in India, the Persian Kingdom which since 1501 had 
adopted the Shi>‘ah ithna> ‘ashariyah as official rite, and the Ottoman 
Sultanate. 
While these Islamic empires, at least during the first half of the 19th 
century, could maintain their sovereignty, nearly all other areas 
inhabited by a majority of Muslims like Algiers (1830) and the rest of 
Northern Africa (except Libya which only in the beginning of the 20th 
century came under Italian rule), Southeast Asia, Central Asia, parts of 
Eastern and Western Africa, and finally Northern India (1857), came 
under imperial rule. The Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, established in 1815, took over the former possessions of 
the Vereeinigde Oostindische Compagnie and expanded its territory. Thus 
millions of Muslims came under non-Muslim rule. 
The responses of the Muslim peoples and leaders were different. 
In Egypt where Napoleon’s invasion only had lasted for 2 years (1798-
1800), a cooperative and constructive attitude could develop, mainly 
sponsored by the ruler Muh }ammad ‘Ali > (died 1848), who did not 
hesitate to invite French and Austrian scholars and experts in different 
fields of sciences and technology to assist him in building up a modern 
Egypt. After it was clear that he was the ruler in his country and not a 
strange king beyond the seas – even the Sultan in Istanbul had to grant 
him a remarkable amount of independency– the good relationship 
between him and the foreigners was benefiting both of them, in spite 
of the cultural and religious otherness which issued not only 
misunderstandings but also jokes. The interactions between Eastern 
values and mentalities and Western ways of thinking and behavior 
underwent their tides throughout the 19th century in Egypt, but at the 
end of it Egypt emerged as a country on the fringe of modernity. Thus, 
when the British appeared and imposed their political will on the 
                                                 
1 Movements more interested in matters of purifying the doctrines or religious 
practices, rites or law like those initiated by Shāh Waliyullah ad-Dihlawi (1703-1762) or 
Muh }ammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1787) should be referred to as Puritanism because 
they were confronting themselves with developments inside the Muslim communities 
which were not caused by external intervention.  
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Egyptian rulers, the foundations for a basically positive relationship 
between Egypt and Europe were already laid, and the conflict centered 
around the political agenda where, alas, it should cause much damage. 
That the cultural and social relations between Egypt and Western 
Europe remained close was to a great deal the merit of Shaykh 
Muh}ammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) who, after a revolutionary period in 
his youth under the influence of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni (see below) 
and his exile in Beirut and Paris (1882-1889), pursued a moderate but 
effective reform program especially in the fields of (Islamic) education 
and law. 
Also in India, a positive mutual relationship between the British 
and the Indians seemed to be a realistic hope. The British (EIC) was 
centered in Bengal (Calcutta), while the heartland of the main Indian 
power, the Moghul Empire, was far in the North, its capital being 
Delhi. Muslim as well as Hindu scholars studied the Western sciences, 
but also the development of Western societies which enabled them to 
play the dominant role in world history which became apparent 
particularly after the Congress of Vienna, the re-empowering of their 
traditional forms of rule, and their fast expansion supported by their 
skills in the sciences and technology including their sophisticated 
weapons which could not be countered by the Eastern peoples. Thus, 
if these, the Easterners, want to achieve a similar progress and 
empowerment, they had to learn as much as possible and also to 
cooperate with the West to reach similar standards. Like in Egypt, 
there was a basically positive attitude towards the Western culture. 
Beside a number of Hindu scholars, there were also Muslim 
intellectuals who supported this understanding, among them Syed 
Ahmad Khan (1817-98), who later on reformed the Muslim 
educational system and, among other activities, established the first 
Muslim university in India (in Aligarh), choosing the English language 
as the medium of instruction. 
The situation, however, changed decisively when the British tried 
to expand their territory and impose their rule on the Moghuls. The 
Sepoy troops, actually part of the Moghul sultan’s soldiers but put 
under British military order, rebelled against their British officers, 
killing some of them. This Mutiny, taking place in 1857, resulted in a 
ferocious British reaction, vandalizing and destroying, among others, 
the city of Delhi.  
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This date, and the response by the British who finally settled down 
in a rebuilt “New Delhi,” changed the political atmosphere in India 
decisively, not only among the Muslims but also among the Hindus. In 
both groups voices emerged and obtained strong support, claiming 
that for the future it would be unthinkable to cooperate in any way 
with these barbarians, and that the modernization of India could only 
be achieved by activating and empowering the own cultural 
inheritance. Thus cultural, including religious, revival was linked with 
the demand for political independence. 
Not all of the political and intellectual leaders in India, both 
Muslims and Hindus, supported this call for non-cooperation or even 
confrontation with the British or, generally speaking, “the West,” 
seeing realistically the distribution of power. Thus, the movements for 
cultural (and religious) Revival split up into two branches: one being 
less political and more open for the mental and educational problems 
of their societies in confronting modernism, the other one seeing its 
main option in self-reliance and empowering the own cultural and 
religious inheritance and thus setting a counter-example against the 
Western paradigm of modernism and progress. For the purpose of this 
paper, we shall now turn to the “uncooperative” second wing of the 
Islamic revivalists, and concentrate on the political issues which 
determined their discourse, in which the Mutiny of 1857 without doubt 
play an initiating role. 
This paper is an attempt to investigate the radicalization of religion 
in several parts of the Islamic world.  It focuses, however, on the 
review of the history of the caliphate and its adjunct notions like “pan-
Islamism” or rule over all Muslims, and jihād to fight for it. Having 
assessed the attempts made by Muslim in several parts of the Islamic 
world in dealing with Western colonialism, the paper then reflects the 
manifestation of Islamic politics in Indonesia. 
From Ukhuwwah Islami >yah to Pan-Islamism: The Experience 
of the Ottoman Sultans 
One of the key terms which emerged is that of the ukhuwwah 
Islāmi >yah, which is usually rendered as “Pan-Islamism”; the Arabic term 
means “Islamic brotherhood” pointing to the brotherly relationship 
between the members of the whole Islamic ummah. In history it was 
closely related to the Caliphate, the caliph as the amīr al-mu’minīn being 
the visible symbol of this unity. But the caliphate only covered the 
political aspect of the unity of the ummah, and in this respect it became 
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very weak. Already during the last three centuries of their rule, the 
Abbasid caliphs lost their power to a number of sultans and other 
territorial rulers, even competing with other caliphs like the Umayyads 
in al-Andalus or the Fatimids in Northern Africa. When the Mongols 
destroyed Baghdad in 1258, the last caliph took refuge in Cairo and 
maintained there a “shadow caliphate”. The Ottoman sultan Selim I 
(regn. 1512-1520) who conquered Cairo in 1517, took the “shadow 
caliph” with him to Istanbul. But the former powerful political 
position of the caliph had lost its meaning. The spiritual dimension of 
the unity of the ummah found its expression in the common shahādah 
and the common qiblah, and here as well as in the legal directions, the 
scholars were the experts. Being successful and powerful, their title as 
caliph which did not originate in their own traditions did not seem to 
be of much interest to the Ottoman sultans, and after Süleyman al-
Kanuni (regn. 1520-1566) it hardly was used.  
That changed in the beginning of the 19th century when the 
Ottoman sultans became the target of aggressions and attacks mainly 
by Russia, which reduced their territory considerably. In this situation, 
the idea of the caliphate was discovered again, hoping that the whole 
Muslim ummah would join in solidarity with the caliph in his struggle to 
maintain his territory, which is part, or even the centre, of Dār al-Islām. 
Thus the notion of the ukhuwwah Islāmi >yah was revived together with 
the memory of the Caliphate, and both became used by the Ottoman 
sultans until the end of their rule in 1922, as a political tool to demand 
support for themselves and their empire.  
The appeal of the Ottoman sultans to join them in their defense of 
their territory being directed to the whole Islamic ummah had, of 
course, a special impact on those Muslims living now under imperial 
rule of one or another of the European powers whose religion was 
Christianity. Thus, the issue of the difference of religion came to new 
importance, and this opened the door for misunderstandings. For 
European observers it was difficult to understand that the position of 
the caliph in the traditional Islamic empire was a legal, albeit a political, 
position, not a religious one because he had no authority in doctrinal 
matters. The confusion roots in terminology, because in Islamic usage, 
“dīn”, usually translated as “religion”, covers also those aspects of law 
which root in the Divine revelation. Therefore, when the caliph is 
referred to as a “dīnī” authority, Westerners would tend to understand 
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that as a religious authority and compare him with the Pope, or as a 
Patriarch as is known in the Eastern Orthodox churches like in Russia.  
This misunderstanding had a fatal impact on the relations with 
Russia. Immediately after the Ottomans had conquered Constan-
tinople, the capital of the former Byzantine empire which had 
continued some of the traditions of the ancient Imperium Romanum (and 
therefore in Arabic and Turkish literature is referred to as “Rūm”; see 
also Su>rat al-Rūm in the Qur’a>n) the ruler of Moscow emerged as “tsar” 
(or kaisar), and beside him the Patriarchate of Moscow, continuing the 
traditions of Byzantium as “the Third Rome”. Thus for Russia, the 
struggle with the Ottomans was not without reminiscence of the 
former role of Istanbul as Constantinople, and behind the attacks 
against the Turks was a little hope to reestablish the old glory of 
Byzantium, or at least take revenge for its defeat. This was a hidden 
agenda, but not really unperceivable as was felt during the Russian-
Ottoman war of 1877-1878 and the Balkan wars during the beginning 
of the 20th century in which Russia, inspired by the ideology of Pan-
Slavism, encouraged the Slavic peoples on the Balkan to free 
themselves from Ottoman supremacy or direct rule. 
On the other side, Sultan Abdülhamid II (regn. 1876-1909), seeing 
the continuous decline of his political power, tried to increase at least 
his “religious” authority by presenting himself as the caliph, referring 
to the Ottoman Constitution promulgated in 1876 by himself which 
states: “The Sultan, as caliph, is the protector of the Islamic Religion.” 
This could be interpreted as an ideological authority including the 
whole Islamic ummah, those who lived inside his realm as well as those 
living outside, under alien political authorities, including those peoples 
ruled by the European imperialists. Hence the comparison with the 
Pope who has also authority on people he does not govern, but hence 
also the fear of the Imperial powers having at least an idea that in 
Islam, everything “religious” could quite quickly turn out to develop 
political energy and dynamics. Therefore, the notion of the ukhuwwah 
Islāmi >yah could quickly mutate into a militant, albeit self-defensive 
ideology, namely, pan-Islamism. 
This inherent energetic and dynamic dimension is usually linked 
with the notion of jihād. Politicians usually do not bother about the 
theological definitions and explanations of the terms and notions they 
use, as long as they benefit their goals. Not so much by scholars than 
by lay people like journalists and intellectuals in the Muslim world, the 
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rebellions or wars against expanding Western imperialist powers during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries therefore were styled as jihād, now 
with the dominant meaning of “war of defense”. In this meaning it had 
not directly a conceptual legitimization in the Islamic traditions, and 
also formally it did not meet with the requirements of the religious law 
to conduct a jihād fī sabīl Allāh. But it could quite well denote the 
emotional dimension inspiring these belligerent encounters. Although 
Sultan Abdülhamid II refrained himself from using the notion of jihād, 
he did not tire to remind the Muslim World that he was their caliph 
and therefore the highest authority in the Islamic religion. 
In classical Islam, the caliph had held a political and legal position 
linked to his role as ruler (or sultan), and as “Commander of the 
Faithful” (amīr al-mu’minīn) this role materialized in his capability of 
establishing and maintaining the integrity of the Dār al-Islām, the 
Islamic Empire. This political role had already eroded considerably 
during the Abbasid caliphate and never recovered again. The proper 
religious authority, however, was in the hands of the Shaykh al-Islām, in 
Turkish Şeh-ül-Islām.  
Usually the Şeh-ül-Islām functioned as muftī of Istanbul before his 
installment as Şeh-ül-Islām, and as such he was also the legal adviser to 
the Sultan. Of course, a muftī is no judge! In the constitutional 
composition of the Ottoman State, the Şeh-ül-Islām maintained a 
position similar to that of the other leaders of religious communities 
(millet) like the Patriarchs of the different Christian Eastern rites, or as 
the Hakam of the Jewish community. He was the head of the Islamic 
millet, of which the caliph, as a Muslim, was also a member. This gave 
him considerable power, and it is understandable that the sultans and 
caliphs of the 19th century, trying to upgrade their “spiritual,” or 
nominal authority among the whole of the Islamic community, 
stripped the Şeh-ül-Islām of most of their power in the constitution of 
1876. This vacuum of authority on the spiritual side was filled in, at 
least partly, by the Sultan’s understanding and practicing of the role of 
the caliph, and he expanded this understanding to the Muslims living 
outside of his sultanate. It was this “new” understanding of the 
caliphate which alerted the imperial powers and made them very 
sensitive and oppressive against any encouragement of pan-Islamist 
ideas, because such mixture of political and religious/ideological 
conceptions had always proven to be of highly explosive potentiality. 
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Even if the caliph was no match for them for the time being, that 
could change very quickly. 
One problem still has to be mentioned which the Ottoman sultans 
were facing with regard to their claim to the caliphate. They were 
neither members of the Āl al-bayt nor the Quraysh in general, thus 
lacking, at least in the minds of traditionally well versed and convinced 
Muslims, a major precondition to become caliphs. How sensitive this 
point has been will be shown in the next paragraph which deals with 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and his tense relations with Abdülhamid II, 
both vocal and practical propagators of Pan-Islamism. 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Abdülhamid II: Propagators of Pan-
Islamism 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1837/8-1897, henceforth “Jamaluddin”) 
is one of the outstanding personalities in that wing of the Islamic 
Resurgence that turned radical and militant after the experience of the 
Mutiny in 1857 and its aftermath.2 It is not quite sure whether 
Jamaluddin in his young years had been an eye-witness of the atrocities 
committed in Delhi in 1857. It is sure, however, that these events 
marked his attitude towards the British until the end of his life.  
After the destruction of the Moghul Empire many observers 
expected the newly rising Kingdom of Afghanistan to take its place as 
the third of the still existing great Islamic Empires. After the death of 
the old king, Amīr Dūst Muh. Khān in 1863, a war of succession broke 
out among his sons, and from 1866-1868 Jamaluddin appears in 
Afghanistan as a supporter of A’zam Khan, one of the pretenders to 
the throne. Jamaluddin advised him strongly not to ally himself with 
the British who wanted to penetrate into Afghanistan, but to approach 
Russia who resented the growing influence of the British close to its 
own central Asian areas of influence. The preference of Jamaluddin to 
Russian imperialism is quite astonishing because at that time, Russia 
                                                 
2 The nisba “al-Afghānī” in his name gave cause to many disputes, cf. the introductions 
to most of the books written about him, but also the interpretations of his personality 
and role in history are very controversial.  See, for example, Nikki R. Keddie, An 
Islamic Response to Imperialism. Including a Translation of the “Refutation of the Materialists”, 
from the original Persian (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968); 
Homa Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-din Assad Abadi dit Afghani (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 
1969); Prof. Dr. HAMKA, Said Djamaluddin al-Afghany (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1970). 
See also Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939 (London: Oxford 
University Press, reprint 1967), pp. 103-129.  
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had already annexed a number of territories formerly belonging to the 
Ottoman Sultanate or being allied with it, in Southeastern Europe and 
around the Black Sea as well as to the East of the Caspian Sea. This 
soft attitude towards Russia should later become one of the main 
reasons for his tense relations with the Persian Shah as well as with the 
Ottoman Sultan. It is also astonishing that the religious motivation 
behind Russia’s policy against the Islamic World did not attract 
Jamaluddin’s attention, being himself considered also as a religious 
reformer of Islam who, like other politically active revivalists, included 
more and more the struggle against “the infidels”, i.e. the imperial 
powers as being Christian, into their agenda. 
After A’zam Khan’s defeat by his younger brother who was 
supported by the British in 1868, Jamaluddin was expelled from 
Afghanistan, and finally he settled in Egypt from 1871-1879. When he 
arrived there, the Suez Channel, built by the French, just had been 
opened in 1869. This caused the British to appear in Egypt because of 
their interest in the channel which shortened the way to their Eastern 
colonies and particularly the “pearl” among them, India, immensely. 
This led to political turmoil in Egypt itself, and the crisis accumulated 
with the bankruptcy of the State in 1875. The Egyptian shares of the 
channel had to be sold to the British who thus took virtual possession 
of it, and this step increased their political and military influence in the 
country considerably. In 1879 they urged that the khedive3 Ismail be 
replaced by the young Taufiq who had to submit himself to British 
orders. An unsuccessful rebellion of egyptian military leaders against 
the British command, led by ‘Urabi Pasha, in 1882 was the last–futile– 
attempt to reduce British dominance. 
This is, in short, the historical background of Jamaluddin’s sojourn 
in Egypt. Being not allowed to give lectures at al-Azhar, he assembled 
a group of interested students, intellectuals, politicians and others 
interested including ‘ulamā’ from al-Azhar like the young Muh }ammad 
‘Abduh (1849-1905) in his home where he held regular sessions to 
                                                 
3 Khedive was the title of the Egyptian rulers after they were recognized by the 
Ottoman Sultan as local rulers under his suzerainty. In 1922, based on a new 
constitution and the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire after Turkey was 
proclaimed a republic in the same year, the title was changed to “king”. The British 
kept their shares until the channel was nationalized by Gamāl ‘Abd an-Nāsir (Nasser) 
in 1956, which led to the “tripartite aggression” of Britain, France and Israel against 
the Egyptian Republic. 
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discuss political and societal problems of the day or to present his 
ideas about the urgent need of a mental and particularly societal 
renewal of the Islamic ummah and the means to achieve it, namely by 
joining the Pan-Islamist movement. One of his focuses was to 
strengthen the awareness of ukhuwwah Islāmi >yah and the obligation of 
all Muslims to resist imperialism, but at the same time to reconstruct 
the Islamic ummah and its society, starting with a radical renewal of 
their understanding of Islam and the methods of their religious, 
scientific and social patterns of thought. He demanded a rational 
approach towards religion, its interpretation and application. His 
lectures left strong impressions in the minds of the younger 
generation, among them, besides ‘Abduh, also ‘Urabi Pasha, Za’d 
Zaghlūl who became a leading Egyptian politician immediately after 
World War I, and even the then crown prince Taufiq. The relation 
with Taufiq, however, proved to be ambiguous, because after his 
ascending to the throne and ‘Urabis futile rebellion, Taufiq knew the 
persons behind the uproar and could easily take measures against 
them. On the instigation of the British, Jamaluddin was expelled 
already in 1879, shortly after Taufiq replaced Ismail, ‘Abduh was 
expelled from his homeland in 1882 and ‘Urabi was exiled to Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka) the same year.  
Again Jamaluddin had experienced the realities of British 
imperialism which underlined his already existing antipathy. 
Nevertheless, with the consent of the British government but with 
strict regulations with regard to his moves, he went to India where he 
spent some years without major agitation. There he took the time to 
write, in Persian, his booklet about the sect of the “naičeri”, a term 
which appeared at that time (derived from “naturalist”) to denote a 
trend in Western thinking which linked itself to the findings of the 
natural sciences and particularly biology, and which ‘Abduh rendered 
in his Arabic translation as dahrī ( “materialist”, “nihilist”). In this 
booklet Jamaluddin criticizes sharply those thinkers of the East, 
particularly Muslims, who let themselves be inspired by Western 
materialist thinking as expressed in the ideology of “naturalism” or 
“Darwinism” which rejects the notion of a Creator and deduces 
everything in the universe to the rule of evolution. One of his main 
targets was (Sir) Syed Ahmad Khan who tended to follow to some 
extend the premises of Charles Darwin’s philosophy. Jamaluddin 
however, like a number of Hindu thinkers at the same time, 
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denounced this philosophy as another attempt of Western thinking to 
undermine the “spirituality” of the East with pseudo-scientific theories 
which attract the attention of simple minded people. For Jamaluddin, it 
only showed another side of Western imperialism, this time in terms of 
mental and intellectual occupation, and again he urged the Muslim 
community to unite into one strong brotherhood in order to 
rediscover and defend its own identity and values. 
With this booklet, the pan-Islamist movement received a new 
dynamism in that the focus switched from the predominant political 
agitation to include also societal, cultural, and spiritual aspects. It 
remained, however, his only independent publication. A series of 
articles, pursuing this topic, he published later, when he lived for few 
years in Paris, in the journal Al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqà (cf. Su>rah 2:256 and 
31:22) which he edited together with ‘Abduh who had joined him in 
Paris in 1884. In this journal both and some other friends of them 
presented their revivalist and reformist ideas, and particularly 
Jamaluddin, also his political views, while ‘Abduh focused on actual 
methods of Qur’anic interpretation, a reform of the legal thinking in 
Islam, and a reconstruction of the Islamic educational system. 
This journal was short-lived. It only appeared for approximately 
half a year in 1884. It then had to close down because of British 
intervention.4 This quick reaction by the British and other colonial 
powers like the Dutch shows, however, how influential in the Islamic 
World even to Southeast Asia this journal had become in such short a 
time. The notion of pan-Islamism had become a symbol to warn that 
forces are on the move which at some time may run out of control, 
thus endangering the whole construct of the Imperialist world order. 
In some of his articles as well as through direct mediation through 
some of his friends in Istanbul Jamaluddin had touched a plan to work 
for an alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Afghanistan and Persia. 
For the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II, such a plan met with his 
deepest hopes, but the Shah was not enthusiastic with a vision to see 
Tehran “reduced to a vassal” to the Sublime Porte.5 Since 1501, the 
Shi>’ah ithna> ‘ashari>yah was proclaimed the official Islamic rite in Iran. 
                                                 
4 Cf. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore-
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 32 fn. 4.; Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-din 
Assad Abadi dit Afghani, pp. 93-106. 
5 Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-din Assad Abadi dit Afghani, p. 106 f. 
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This had led to some amount of isolation experienced by the Persians 
in the Islamic World. In his understanding of pan-Islamism, 
Jamaluddin had included the Shi >’ah without any prejudices. Thus, on 
one side the Shah may have seen in Jamaluddin a combatant in efforts 
to approach the Sunni part of the Islamic community. On the other 
hand the Shah was suspicious about the aims of Sultan Abdülhamit II 
and his way of propagating pan-Islamism, fearing that finally the Sultan 
might play a dominant role reducing others to subordinate positions. 
Other political activities in Paris involved him in the Mahdi crisis 
in Sudan. Jamaluddin mentioned the Mahdi as one of his former 
disciples in Cairo.6 For him, the sole solution would be a withdrawal of 
the British from both, the Sudan and Egypt, for which he also hoped 
to find some support from the French government.  
In mid-1885, on the invitation of S. Wilfred Blunt (1840-1922), an 
English poet and stern sympathizer with anti-imperialist movements, 
particularly pan-Islamism and the revolt of the Mahdi in Sudan, 
Jamaluddin moved to London where he could meet with various 
British politicians to discuss mainly the situation in the Sudan and 
possible solutions. There was some hope that his relations with the 
Mahdi might be helpful to find some acceptable way out of the crisis. 
When he was asked by Randolph Churchill about the prospects of 
reconciliation between the British and the Islamic world his answer 
was short and clear: the British should leave Egypt, and they should 
support an alliance between Afghanistan, Persia, and the Ottoman 
Empire. This option for his pan-Islamic agenda was clear, but it 
showed also that the British had to choose either to obtain friendship 
with the Islamic World, or to maintain their imperialist strategy. Thus 
pan-Islamism proved to be the ideology directly confronting the 
imperial interests. There was no bridge between both. This messaged 
was heard, and henceforth measures to be taken against the spread of 
pan-Islamism ranged on the top of the agenda of the imperialist 
powers. 
From London Jamaluddin went to Persia where he obtained a 
warm welcome by Nasiruddin Shah (regn. 1848-1896). The Shah, 
however, because of his despotic rule and little care for the welfare of 
his people, was much despised, by the people and by the religious 
                                                 
6 Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-din Assad Abadi dit Afghani, p. 91, where she quotes a letter of 
Jamaluddin’s. 
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scholars. Jamaluddin opted with their grievances and favored a change 
of rule, maybe establishing a republic. Thus his relations with the Shah 
quickly deteriorated although openly they continued to exchange polite 
messages. Finally with the permission of the Shah Jamaluddin left 
Persia in 1887 “for Europe”.  
His destination was Russia. Two years he spent in St. Petersburg 
where he met also with some political personalities from the entourage 
of the Tsar. The Russian government saw with increasing disdain the 
growing influence of Britain particularly in the South of Persia, but 
also its increasing domination of the finances and economics 
throughout that country. With the support of Jamaladdin the Russians 
obviously hoped to convince the Shah to readjust his pro-British 
policy. As some kind of intermediary, Jamaluddin returned to Tehran 
in 1889 and again was welcomed by the Shah. 
But finally, the view points and interests of both were too much 
opposed to each other. For the Shah, Russia was the great threat in the 
north, not so much Britain. With a British merchant, the Shah had just 
prolonged a treaty giving concession to sell the complete production of 
tobacco, which among other things meant that big areas of land could 
not be used any longer to grow grains and other food-staff because 
they had to be planted with tobacco. This caused a remarkable 
shortage of food supply, and the reaction of the Persian religious 
scholars (mujtahid or Molla) was a fatwa> declaring the consummation 
of tobacco as h}arām; it may be remembered that at the beginning of the 
same century, the Wahhabis in Arabia had issued a similar fatwa> against 
tobacco, albeit for other reasons.  
Jamaluddin supported the people and the scholars, thus evoking 
again the anger of the Shah who earned good benefit from this and 
other deals with the British. With regard to the Shah’s concern about 
Russia, Jamaluddin again was not very responsive. He may have 
envisioned that both, Persia and Russia, could also be allies in his anti-
British agitation. In 1891, Jamaluddin was expelled by the Shah. In 
1896, Nasiruddin Shah who had become extremely unpopular and 
tyrannical, was killed by a follower of Jamaluddin. 
Via London where he stayed a few months, Jamaluddin traveled, 
on the invitation of Sultan Abdülhamid II, in 1892 to Istanbul where 
he stayed for the rest of his life. A first invitation which reached him in 
London, he refused. The second invitation used stronger words: Not 
following the orders of the Sultan means to disregard the orders of 
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God!7 Also the British wanted him out of their country because of his 
anti-Persian agitation which strained their relations with the Shah. 
Additional alarm caused a note from the British consul in Cairo 
transmitting the French translation of a secret paper, compiled by 
Jamaluddin in London, designing an alliance between Afghanistan and 
the Ottoman Empire, leaving it to Persia to join in spite of the Shah’s 
resentments or to see himself isolated amidst the Islamic World.  
Now, with accepting the Sultan’s invitation, the ruler who used 
pan-Islamism to strengthen his religious authority among the Islamic 
ummah, and the propagator of pan-Islamism who wanted to transform 
it into a forceful movement against foreign imperialism in Muslim 
territory, came to meet each other. But again, their mutual expectations 
did not meet. The Sultan was suspicious whether Jamaluddin’s support 
for him was sincere. There were rumors that during his short sojourn 
in London, Jamaluddin had met with some Arab shaykhs and ‘ulamā’ to 
discuss the possibility of establishing an Arab caliphate. It does not 
seem impossible that such a plan might have obtained some support 
from the British. On one side, such a move would weaken the position 
of the Ottoman Sultan, on the other side would an Arab caliph 
without own territory but only as an idealistic symbol and with some 
amount of spiritual authority be of no threat to the imperialist powers, 
and therefore such a caliphate which had no chance to develop any 
political power could be accepted by them.  
Jamaluddin’s position is not quite clear. It is difficult to imagine 
that he, who consistently linked the caliphate to political action, could 
accept a mere symbolic caliphate. Sultan Abdülhamit II, however, was 
alerted. He knew about his political weakness and therefore had to 
resort in one or another way to an idealistic understanding as well, as 
suggested the Constitution of 1876. To disperse the Sultan’s suspicion, 
Jamaluddin discussed with him a plan to invite a congress of ‘ulamā’ 
from most parts over the Islamic world to discuss the question of the 
caliphate. Such a congress could strengthen the position of the Sultan. 
But the Shah refused, and the congress did not take place.8 After that 
Jamaluddin busied himself again with his agitation against the Shah. 
Since he also approached non-Muslim Persians to join forces in order 
to free Persia from the Shah, a public discussion was launched against 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 169. 
8 Ibid., p. 172. 
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him questioning his religious credibility as a Muslim.9 New trouble in 
his relation with the Sultan emerged when the new khedive of Egypt, 
Hilmi, paid a visit to the “Sublime Porte” in 1895.10 His demand to 
meet with Jamaluddin was rejected; therefore they met in secret, 
observed however by the Sultan’s secret police. Abdülhamit II was 
obviously afraid that an Arab caliphate might be discussed again. But 
when after the murder of Nasiruddin Shah the Persian government 
demanded the extradition of Jamaluddin, the Sultan refused. One year 
later, in 1897, Jamaluddin died in Istanbul because of cancer. Rumors 
that he might have been poisoned on the order of the Sultan were 
repelled by medical records. 
A decisive part of his legacy was his using religious (Islamic) 
language for political tools, thus supporting the notion of Islam as “dīn 
wa dawlah”, as religion and state, or the merger between politics and 
religion, without questioning the origin of such a construct.11 The 
symbol for this was the caliph as the supreme leader of the Islamic 
ummah, but here the problems occur: although tradition would urge 
him to be the religious and political leader in one, reality confined the 
role of the actual caliph to that of a weak politician and a questionable 
symbolic focus of orientation thus leaving the concept of pan-
Islamism pending somewhat in the air – to the relaxation of the 
imperial powers. Remains the question: what about jihād, the third 
element in this traditional concept of one ummah under one amīr al-
mu’minīn? 
The Promulgation of Jiha>d: From Pan-Islamism to Anti- 
imperialism 
Before coming back to such a question, some other political 
developments have to be considered. The proclamation of the German 
Kaiserreich in 1871 brought another actor to the stage of international 
politics. Germany, until then divided into a number of kingdoms and 
principalities, had played no role in the colonial and imperial history, 
having left the imperial tradition to Austria. When the third Kaiser, 
                                                 
9 Keddi, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, p. 33 f. 
10 Al-Ba >b al‘A<li> was  the common reference code for the sultan’s government quarters 
in Istanbul, referring to one of its entrance gates, like the “White House” is a symbol 
for the US-president’s residence. 
11 To elaborate on this question would need more space.  
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Wilhelm II (regn. 1888-1918), initiated a greater presence of Germany 
among the great powers, the cake of territories which could be 
colonized was, except of some greater areas in Africa, already 
distributed, particularly in the Islamic World. He therefore had to find 
a place on the world market, particularly for the products of the 
quickly emerging German industry.  
The Kaiser found his partner in Sultan Abdülhamit II. The Sultan, 
weekend after the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877/8, accepted German 
assistance to rebuild his army. Other help was offered and accepted to 
develop the infrastructure, including the Baghdad railway on which the 
British were already working. This double assignment led to a lasting 
conflict between Britain and Germany. The assistance of Germany 
helped the Sultan to repay his debts to Britain and France who until 
then had planted a lot of capital and expected the repayment of their 
interest. 
A special occasion to underline the close relations between the 
Sultanate and the Kaiserreich was Kaiser Wilhelm II’s visit to Istanbul 
and the Middle East, particularly Syria and Palestine in 1898. In a 
speech he delivered at the tomb of Sultan Salāh ad-Dīn (Saladin) in 
Damascus the Kaiser said: May the whole Islamic community, where-
ever they live, accept this oath that the German Emperor always will 
be their friend.12 The Sultan as well the Kaiser used every chance to 
appear as magnificent rulers, representing to some degree the glory of 
the East and the power of the West, not forgetting the religious 
aspects in both of them. Historical reminders should underline their 
encounter: During the friendly exchanges between Charlemagne as the 
first emperor of the Franks  and the caliph Harūn al-Rashīd, the caliph 
is said to have once offered to the emperor to become the protector of 
the Christians residing in the Middle East, especially those living in the 
Holy Land (Palestine). That offer was, of course, unpractical at that 
time. For Kaiser Wilhelm II this idea seemed to be attractive, seeing 
himself in the footsteps of Charlemagne as prince of the Christians, 
and as protector of the Christians in that area, but with one decisive 
difference with regard to the later developments during the crusades: 
he would come as an ally of the Islamic community, not with an army 
                                                 
12 Quoted in Matti Schindehütte, Zivilreligion als Verantwortung der Gesellschaft. Religion als 
politischer Faktor innerhalb der Entwicklung der Pancasila Indonesiens (Hamburg: Abera, 
2006), p. 72. 
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to fight against them. If fight should become necessary, then together 
with them against their enemies. 
The visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II had a great impact, although the 
interpretations given by the Ottomans and the Germans may differ to 
some degrees. But that was not expressed at that time. If the Kaiser 
accepts the protectorate over the Christians offered to him by the 
Sultan, than in the Sultan’s understanding he would become a kind of 
vassal. Especially after the tanzīmāt, the Christians like other non-
Muslims had acquired a kind of citizenship. Therefore, to call the Kaiser 
a protector of the Christians in the Middle East – who are and remain 
citizens of the Sultanate – and accept this role as a sign of friendship 
can only mean that the Kaiser accepts the Sultan’s superiority in this 
matter. As Sultan and Caliph, the Ottoman ruler remains the 
souvereign of the Oriental Christians. No wonder that Abdülhamit II 
praised the Kaiser’s policy as strengtening his position on the stage of 
international politics. 
And support was also given to the pan-Islamist ambitions of the 
Sultan. In the years before World War I, it became more and more 
apparent that the Sultan’s enemies, or the opponents of pan-Islamism, 
became, with few exceptions like the Netherlands, the enemies of the 
Kaiserreich. Supported by German oriental scholars like Max von 
Oppenheim, respected author of some books about the Bedouins of 
the Sahara and at that time working at the German consulate in Cairo, 
and others the German diplomats in the Middle East were encouraged 
to support the Sultan’s propagation of pan-Islamism and his role as 
caliph in it. Even the option to call for a jihād in the case of a war 
should be stimulated and supported. If it succeeded and the Muslim 
subjects of the imperial powers raise their arms against their “infidel” 
rulers, than not only the case of Islam could take a positive turn. 
Simultaneously it would decisively weaken the enemies of Germany 
and their allies, and thus strengthen the whole anti-imperialist front. 
For the Turkish leadership there was no doubt that in case of a victory 
of the imperial powers (mainly Britain, France, and Russia) the 
Ottoman Sultanate would be divided and thus terminate its history, 
while a victory of the Germans and their allies would lead to German 
economic hegemony.13  
                                                 
13 Josef Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich. Grundzüge seiner Geschichte, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), p. 263. 
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In August 1914 the war broke out and the Sultanate was drawn 
into it on the side of the Germans. In November of the same year, 
Sultan Mehmet V Reşat (regn. 1909-1918) as caliph, urged by his 
German advisors and particularly the Kaiser, demanded that the 
religious authorities proclaim the jihād, what they did.  
But the reaction in the Islamic world was close to zero. The Young 
Turks who had taken over the government in the Sultanate after a coup 
d’état and the de-throning of Abdülhamit II in 1909, had made 
themselves enemies to nearly all non-Turk ethnic groups, Muslim or 
not, living in the multi-ethnic Sultanate. Arab nationalism (or al-
qawmi >yah al-`arabi >yah) had already been the answer of the Arab 
intellectuals throughout the “Fertile Crescent” in the 1880s when 
Young Turkism started its development. The Sharif Husain of Mekka, 
protector of al-H{aramayn, bluntly refused to support the idea of a jihād 
against the British, but he pursued already another agenda. In 1916, 
supported by some British diplomats in the Middle East who opted 
against too close relations with the French, he and his sons started the 
“revolt in the desert”, after they were promised to rule over an Arab 
kingdom including the former Arab provinces in the Ottoman 
Sultanate. Only after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 and 
their publishing the secret imperial archives the Arabs realized that 
they were cheated. The Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and 
France which later was implemented, proposed a division of the Arab 
areas into spheres of British and those of French interest.  When the 
legendary secret agent T.E. Lawrence published his records about the 
“revolt in the desert” under the title: The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the 
Arabs called it The Seven Pillars of Treason. 
Politically, the declaration of the jihād was a flop. But it led to a 
heated discussion among European scholars on each side of the 
European front. The Germans, as mentioned already, not only 
supported the Sultan in this matter, they also justified his option for 
pan-Islamism as a proper tool to defend his position and, in his 
capacity and responsibility as caliph, to lead the Muslims in their 
struggle to free themselves from the rule of the “infidels”. C.H. Becker 
puts forward the following remark:  
If Turkey at present in its foreign policy uses pan-Islamism, 
it justifies it as a means of self-defense. Britain and Russia 
put pressure on Turkey because they want to enlarge the 
territories under their rule, and France tries to bring Turkey 
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under its financial control. …Millions of Muslims feel 
themselves suppressed by the great powers.  …If Turkey 
underlines the spiritual bond which unites all Muslims, then 
it weakens the European powers who rule over so many 
Muslims. …There are people who criticize the use of a 
common religion (for political goals). But what did Britain, 
France and Russia do during the last century? Their 
common interests were also their main motivator while 
enlarging their influences on Turkish territory. … They 
used religion in their policies for imperial goals. Turkey 
uses it in order to defend itself and to safeguard its 
existence.14  
Becker made some efforts to disperse suspicions that the Ottoman 
caliph might use jihād in the same sense, a suspicion nurtured by the 
imperial powers, including the Netherlands whose colonial politicians 
were advised in matters related to Islam by the outstanding Dutch 
oriental scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje whom Becker regarded 
as one of his teachers. But Becker underlined that the present 
understanding of jihād had changed and that the Ottoman sultan and 
caliph uses jihād, his title as caliph, and pan-Islamism as the inspiring 
ideology to join forces in fighting the imperialists in order to safeguard 
the continuation of his empire and to enable him to reconstruct the 
glory of the ummah and of the Islamic civilization. Becker 
acknowledged that such policy and every appeal to Muslims who live 
under non-Muslim governments would be considered as interference 
into their “internal affairs” by the imperial powers.  
Becker obviously tried to minimize the “pure” religious dimension 
in the use of pan-Islamism and the understanding of the caliphate as 
maintained by the last Ottoman sultans. The sultan, he explains, is not 
a Pope but a secular ruler with the sharī‛ah, as “holy Law”, at his side. 
However, not the caliph but the Şeh-ül-Islām is the highest authority to 
interpret the sharī‛ah, and this did not change even after the authority 
of the Şeh-ül-Islām declined during the reign of Abdülhamit II. The 
sharī‛ah even in the few sections of social life were it was maintained 
                                                 
14 Carl Heinrich Becker, “Islampolitik,” in: Ibid., Islamstudien, vol. II (reprint 
Hildesheim: Olms, 1967): pp. 310-332, pp. 316-317. This article appeared for the first 
time in 1915; cf. also Matti Schindehütte, “Religion als politischer Faktor. Erinnerung 
an die Dschihadisierung der deutsch-türkischen Waffenbruderschaft,” in Zeitschrift für 
Mission 33 (2007), pp. 10-20. C.H. Becker (1876-1933) was in his time one of the 
outstanding German oriental scholars. 
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after the tanzīmāt is not a written law, as Becker explains. It is, 
moreover, an ongoing discourse about the obligations of a Muslim, 
and the “Islamic character” of the Islamic revival, including pan-
Islamism, is rooted in this dynamic process, not in a formalistic 
“islamic” structure of the rule. Therefore, and this is Becker’s 
intention, the traditional notions related to the caliphate, jihād and pan-
Islamism do not inspire anymore the policy of present day Ottoman 
rulers but have been reshaped essentially to meet the present needs.  
This argument was not accepted by Becker’s opponents. They 
might agree with him that these notions were considered to be out of 
date by most of the Muslims, but they would add that the majority of 
the Muslims would also feel no inclination to revive them knowing 
how easily they could get out of control and ignate fanaticism. The 
poor reaction in the Muslim world on the proclamation of the jihād in 
1914 would support their judgment. Jihād was used in a general sense 
in newspapers using Oriental languages during the Balkan wars, and 
during Italy’s invasion into Libya, as “wars of defense”, but without 
connection to the caliph or pan-Islamism, and without any fatwa> to 
proclaim it. Therefore, there was no Islamic legitimation for these 
jihāds. The jihād proclaimed in 1914 met the formal requirements, but 
its lengthy explanation did not convince that it was for the need of the 
Islamic umma. Its focus stressed the continuation of the Ottoman 
Sultanate. As such it was not a jihād generally supported by the 
Muslims and, moreover, was urged for by a non-Muslim ruler. 
Therefore, the Entente-powes called it bluntly a jihād made in Germany, 
more or less imposed even on the caliph who had hesitated for some 
while before agreeing to demand its proclamation. But with this 
background, the jihād had lost any similarity with its medieval 
understanding as being strictly associated with Islam only. How much 
its actual understanding was already determined by general political 
considerations came to the open by a somewhat cryptical event.  
In the text of the proclamation the Netherlands were mentioned 
among those who ruled unjustly over Muslims.15 The definition of 
such a status where the Muslim subjects made their peace with a non-
Muslim ruler is termed as, according to this paper, “gebied der 
                                                 
15 I refer to a Dutch translation presented by C. Snouck Hurgronje, Verspreide 
Geschriften, deel III (Bonn – Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1923): pp. 31-351; p. 342. 
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goddeloosheid” or da>r al-kufr.16 But the Netherlands were also in peace 
with the Caliph. So, half a year later a “Correction” was distributed 
underlining that the jihād was only declared against those who were in 
war with the caliphate. Therefore, the Muslims of the Netherlands’ 
Indies were excluded from this call to revolt.17 
Among the scholars outside of Germany who vehemently 
denounced the German jihād-policy as a playing with the fire, or trying 
to “unearth the mummies buried already at the end of the middle 
ages,” was Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936).18 In an 
emotional article published also in 1915 in a New York newspaper – 
the United States had at that time not yet declared war against 
Germany – under the heading “Islam made in Germany” he first 
praises the Young Turks who had dethroned the “despot” Abdülhamit 
II in 1908 and restored the constitution, but because of the enmity of 
the imperial powers, the Young Turks were forced to revive despotic 
rule. “Also the fetish of the caliphate had to be exhumed again from 
the museum of antiquities where it had temporarily been stored. As to 
the idea of jihad, which was so closely connected with it, the European 
powers took care that it was not forgotten. Turkey was continually 
forced to a jihad”.19 Thus Snouck Hurgronje refuted the policy of the 
imperial powers that based it on their erroneous assumption that the 
Muslims consider the caliph as their highest authority in religious 
matters. That assumption he calls “nonsense”, but this nonsense is the 
basis of the imperial powers and their attitude towards the Ottoman 
sultan and caliph, and also the Germans adopted it and justified their 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 345. According to other Islamic traditions, it might have been called also da >r 
al-sala >m.  But “peace” was not the topic of the day.  
17 Ibid., p. 352 f.: “Verbetering eener vergissing”. 
18 From among the many articles on C. Snouck Hurgronje and his attitude towards 
Islam, I just want to mention a few: H. Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam Hindia Belanda 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); Hamid Algadri, C. Snouck Hurgronje. Politik Belanda terhadap 
Islam dan Keturunan Arab (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984); Harry J. Benda, “Christiaan 
Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia,” in 
Ibid., Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia, Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, 1972); and 
Taufik Abdullah’s short but informative “Introduction” to the translation of 
Hurgronjes paper Islam di Hindia Belanda (Jakarta: Bhatara, 1973) pp. 5-12. 
19 The whole article “Islam made in Germany’ also in Verspreide Geschriften, deel III, pp. 
259-284, quotation on p. 268. 
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policy by it. While the imperial states allied in the “Entente cordial” 
(Britain, France, later Russia until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917) 
aimed finally to destroy the Sultanate with its decaying power 
structures which only could function under despotic and unscrupulous 
rulers like Abdülhamit II and his successor Mehmet V Reşat. 
Germany, on the other side, was forced to ally itself with these rulers 
who were hated and rejected by their people, and therefore as well was 
forced to support the medieval structures of the past history of Islam 
which they kept alive and strengthened them for their own benefit. “I 
may already now foretell with certainty that within a not very long 
time, a number of German writings will testify that also in Germany 
indignation has been aroused by the despicable game that is being 
played with the Caliphate and the holy war”.20 
For Snouck Hurgronje, the corpus of Islamic thought had been 
developed in three main areas: (1) pure religious (dogma, worship), (2) 
social or societal, (3) political.21 While he accepted numbers (1) and (2) 
whole-heartily, he also urged the colonial government to support its 
development under the premises of “freedom of religion”. The third 
one, however, whose actual expression he linked particularly with pan-
Islamism as a fanatical and antiquated movement, should not be 
tolerated by any pretext. Stressing the neutrality of the Netherlands in 
the current political conflicts in Europe and his personal good relations 
to Germany and German scholars, he vehemently rejected Becker’s 
option for a cooperation with either the propagators of pan-Islamism 
as an anti-imperial ideology or the politicians who fight a jihād under its 
banner like the Turkish government supported by the German Kaiser, 
and admitted that in that point, the Dutch interests met with those of 
the other imperial powers. 
Becker, in another article, replied to the allegations of Snouck 
Hurgronje.22 The arguments of both of them still deserve sincere 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 282. 
21 Hurgronje frequently made this point, usually linking it with his vision of a “national 
synthesis” between the Dutch and their Indonesian subjects, particularly the Muslims, 
cf. e.g. Abdullah, “Introduction,” p. 9. 
22 C.H. Becker, “Die Kriegsdiskussion über den Heiligen Krieg (1915),” in Islamstudien, 
loc. cit., pp. 281-309; A comprehensive study, based on archive material, about the 
German Imperial policy towards Islam in the 19th and early 20th centuries, has recently 
been published by Wolfgang C. Schwanitz, Djihad made in Germany. Deutsche Islam-Politik 
im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Trafo, 2005), a second edition is in preparation. 
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attention, not at least because they help to highlight some of the basic 
roots of conflict even in the present confrontations between “the 
Islamic” and “the Western” worlds. Only few analyses have been 
presented until now who look behind the surface and reveal the 
intrigues and manipulations, but since their findings do not support 
the interests of the rulers even nowadays, they usually are withheld 
from public attention. In some concluding remarks the reaction among 
the Muslim public itself on the caliphate, pan-Islamism and jihād may 
just be summarized. It must be remembered, however, that the 
Ottoman Sultanate, together with the German Kaiserreich and their 
allies, were defeated in the war, and the situation after that was 
determined by the , Entente, without the Russians, however, because 
the Bolsheviks after their revolution had no intention to continue the 
“Byzantine” politics of the Tsar. A map of Turkey how the Entente-
powers designed it in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 may be seen in the 
book of Josef Matuz.23 Under pressure, it was accepted by the Sultan, 
but it was rejected by the Young Turks, of course. 
Towards Inclusive Politics: The Case of Indonesian Islam 
As expected, the Entente dismantled the Sultanate and, according to 
the doctrines of the American President Wilson about every people’s 
right of self-determination, reduced Turkey to those areas where, 
according to their perception, ethnic Turks were living, that means 
basically only in central Anatolia. The Young Turks or “Kemalists” 
(called after General Mustapha Kemal, later “Atatürk”), now in open 
defiance to the sultan, reacted. After a war with Greece, Istanbul with 
Eastern Thracia around Edirne on European soil was “rescued” for 
the Turks. Before that, the Şeh-ül-Islām, on the instigation of the Caliph, 
had issued a fatwa> declaring jihād against the rebels. The muftī of 
Ankara, however, supported by Anatolian ‘ulamā’ and lay-scholars, 
issued a counter fatwa>.24 In November 1922, the Kemalists abolished 
the Sultanate and in 1923 the General Assembly proclaimed the 
Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti). The Sultan and Caliph, Mehmet 
VI Vahideddin (regn. 1918-1922) was expelled, and Abdülmecit II 
installed as caliph, without any political power.25 In the peace treaty of 
                                                 
23 Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, p. 331. 
24 Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, p. 272 f. 
25 Matuz compares his position to that of the Abbasid “shadow-caliph” in Cairo after 
1258.  Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, p. 277. 
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Lausanne 1923, Turkey’s sovereignty was restored over East-Thracia 
and the whole of Anatolia. In 1924, the caliphate was also abolished, 
again the caliph was expelled, and thus the history of the caliphate was 
terminated. In the understanding of the Young Turks, these steps 
meant the liberation not only of the Turkish Muslims, but of the 
Muslim community everywhere from an un-Islamic, actually Byzantine 
inheritance which had corrupted Islam and especially its ruling system 
and its civilization which was formed by it.26 Islam, thus purified now, 
should be related to the Turkish culture, and this interpenetration of 
both should be the basis of the new Turkish identity. To achieve this, 
no traditional ‛ulamā’ are needed, and thus the concept of “laicism” was 
born, becoming the trade mark of Kemalism, called after Kemal 
Mustapha “Atatürk”, the founder of modern Turkey in the tradition of 
the Young Turks. 
The Arab official leaders reacted with some protest against the 
abolishment of the caliphate. But their own efforts to re-establish a 
new caliphate failed as well. Two pretenders for such a position 
emerged: one was the Egyptian king Fuad II – after a constitutional 
reform in 1922, Egypt was proclaimed to be parliamentary monarchy -  
and the other one was ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al Sa‘ūd, the new ruler of Arabia 
and the Hijāz after he had defeated the Sharīf Husain. Some scholars 
in the intellectual line of Jamaluddin like Muh. Rashīd Ridā, a disciple 
of Muh}ammad ‘Abduh, defended vehemently the need of a caliph to 
give guidance to the ummah particularly in the present times of foreign 
suppression and internal turmoil caused by the influences of modern 
scientific and societal conceptions. They got, of course, some public 
support particularly by the rulers and conservative ‛ulamā’, while others 
like ‘Ali ‘Abd ar-Rāziq, another disciple of ‘Abduh’s who also praised 
the steps of the Kemalists in Turkey as a step of liberation for Islam, 
were publicly condemned and stripped of their public positions. 
Amidst this controversy, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz called for an all-Islamic 
conference, a mu‘tamar al-`a>lam al-Isla>mi >, with the main task to elect a 
new caliph. Since both pretenders obviously opted for the 
establishment of a new hereditary caliphate linked to their families, the 
enthusiasm for this endeavor was very limited and ended in no result. 
Until now the Islamic community survived without a caliph, and the 
                                                 
26 Thus Ziya Gökalp, The Principles of Turkism (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 32 ff. 
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Islamic ummah as a whole seems to be not much embarrassed by this 
state of affairs. 
In Indonesia, the move of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz evoked also a controversy, 
but not so much about the caliphate as such as about the question of 
who was apt to represent the Indonesian Muslims at such a 
conference. The Islamic politicians, represented mainly in Serikat 
Islam, claimed this right for themselves, but they were challenged by 
the ‛ulamā’ who understand Islam in the light of the traditions of ahl al-
sunnah wa al-jamā‛ah. No particular interest for the question of the 
caliphate was apparent. In their political and societal aspirations the 
Muslims of the Dutch colony in general joined forces with the 
religiously neutral nationalists, Muslims and others.  In this alliance, 
and not under the banner of an ideology and political system whose 
roots in Islam are questionable, they finally achieved what they desired: 
national independence and unrestricted freedom to express and 
practice also their religious convictions.  
It is noteworthy that the great majority of the Muslims whenever 
they have a chance to voice their aspirations, do not support a 
radicalization or even militarization of their religion. In the Middle 
East, most of the Muslims until now had no chance to voice their 
political or societal aspirations; therefore it is not appropriate to make 
general statements about their political will. It is worth noting 
however, that moderate Muslim writers in Indonesia very often quote 
from books written in Arabic by moderate Muslims in the Middle East. 
Muslims in Indonesia had this chance to opt for their political or 
societal aspirations in several general elections, and the large majority 
of them voted for politicians and parties who pursue an inclusive 
policy, reflecting the plural composition of their society.  
Conclusion 
A critical review of the history of the caliphate and its adjunct 
notions like “pan-Islamism” or rule over all Muslims, and jihād to fight 
for it will reveal that ever since the dawlah of the Bani Umayya until the 
end of Ottoman dawlah, the ideal served very much the interests of the 
rulers and their dynasties and associates, either to legitimize expansion, 
or to justify resistance against others which finally served again their 
own interests. Not only the Ottoman sultans, but also Jamaluddin were 
very selective in defining the targets of jihād. These were not only non-
Muslim rulers–and even not all among them–; they could be Muslims 
as well if they opposed the ruler who identifies himself with God: his 
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enemies are automatically the enemies of God! Maybe that is the 
deepest reason why finally, the majority of the Islamic ummah turned 
away from politicizing their religion and decided to use political tools 
to achieve political aims, even when defending themselves against 
iniquities and oppression. The mujāhidūn in our days still have to face 
the same question: in whose interests are they fighting?. [] 
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